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I. Introduction
It would be difficult to find three more controversial topics in the American west today 
than water, urban growth, and the protection of endangered species. These three topics 
are intimately linked in a see-saw relationship, with water as the pivot point. Limited 
water defines the west. Human settlement of the west was made feasible by engineering 
marvels that brought water where nature had not Those transfers, however, have turned 
out not to be as costless as they once appeared. Other species depend on the natural 
quantity and quality of water. Human consumption, redistribution, and alteration of 
western water have brought many of those species to the brink of extinction.
We are used to thinking of endangered species as a consequence of the old west’s 
resource industries. The historic decline of western species, including aquatic species, is 
primarily attributable to agriculture, logging, and hydropower. But the new, urban west 
makes its own demands on water, and poses its own threats to species. With western 
population growth accelerating, and more and more aquatic species reaching the 
endangered and threatened list, conflicts between the two are virtually certain to intensify.
Endangered species problems will be part of the picture of western growth for the 
foreseeable future. Whether and how we solve those problems will have a lot to do with 
the future of the west’s human communities as well as its natural ones.
II. Conflicts Between Population Centers and Water-Dependent Species in the West
Notwithstanding its lingering cowboy image, the west has long been the most urbanized 
region of the country. It is also the fastest growing region. The major cities of the west,
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especially those in the interaiountain region, continue to grow explosively. The residents 
of these cities and suburbs consume water, not just for their basic needs, but also for the 
industries that employ them, to generate the electricity that lights their homes and, in vast 
quantities, to keep their landscapes green and lush.
Competing for that same water are an ever-growing number of species listed as federally 
endangered or threatened. Of the 495 U.S. animals currently included on the federal 
protected list, 112 are fishes. Many others are aquatic or highly water-dependent.
Overall, according to the Biological Resources Division of the U.S. Geological Survey, 
freshwater fishes are the single most imperiled vertebrate group in the United States. 
Fully 57% of California’s historic fish taxa are either extinct or on the road to extinction. 
The fishes of the Great Basin have fared no better. Of 131 historic taxa, 10 are extinct 
and 75 are listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), candidates for listing, or 
considered species of concern by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
The most dire threat to western aquatic species is the invasion of exotic species, many 
deliberately imported, which compete with, prey on, and hybridize with the natives. See 
Brian D. Richter et al., Threats to Imperiled Freshwater Fauna, 11 Conservation Biology 
1081 (1997). But alterations of habitat and hydrology by surface water removal and 
impoundment are also critical threats to a large proportion of the region’s imperiled 
aquatic species. Dams built to supply hydropower, control floods, and store water for 
agricultural and municipal uses block access to miles of streams, and change water 
temperatures and chemistry. Water withdrawals can be so extreme that they leave 
streambeds dry. Short of that, they too alter water temperatures, flow regimes, and 
quality. Irrigated agriculture remains by far the largest consumer of western water. 
Municipal water consumption, though, accounts for an ever-larger share of the total. 
Between 1960 and 1990, however, the amount of water withdrawn for domestic use more 
than doubled, growing at a ratd even faster than the region’s population.
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Water pollution, primarily in the form of addition of sediment and nutrients to waterways, 
is also a significant threat to aquatic species. As with water withdrawals, agriculture 
remains the primary culprit for water pollution, but urban run-off is a growing problem.
A quick survey of several current conflicts between endangered species and the growing 
population centers of the west over the region’s limited water resources illustrates the 
pervasiveness of those conflicts. They span the west, extending from the Pacific Coast to 
the hundredth meridian, and from the Canadian border in the north to the Mexican border 
in the south.
Our quick tour begins in San Antonio, just east of the hundredth meridian that marks the 
boundary of the mythical west. San Marcos and Comal Springs, the largest springs in the 
southwestern United States, flow out of the Edwards Aquifer to feed the Guadalupe 
River. The springs support a unique aquatic ecosystem, including seven endangered 
species (the San Marcos gambusia, fountain darter, Texas blind salamander, Peck’s cave 
amphipod, Comal Springs riffle beetle, Comal Springs dryopid beetle, and Texas wild 
rice), and one threatened species (the San Marcos salamander). The aquifer, however, 
also supplies the sole source of drinking water for San Antonio’s two million residents. 
Pumping from the aquifer has diminished the flow from the springs, putting species that 
depend on that flow at risk. Although the aquifer also provides water for agricultural and 
industrial users in the region, municipal use accounted for more than half of the pumping 
in the 1980s. Stress on the region’s water resources will surely increase; its population is 
expected to increase 40% or more by 2010.
Not far to the west, Albuquerque sits on the banks of the Rio Grande. Nonetheless, it too 
currently relies entirely on groundwater. Albuquerque does, however, have rights to 
water brought to the Rio Grande from the Colorado system by the federal San Juan- 
Chama Project. As required by state law, Albuquerque acquired that water to replace 
seepage from the Rio Grande that was thought to be recharging its aquifer. It now
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appears, however, that the aquifer is not recharging as expected. Consequently, 
Albuquerque plans to divert its San Juan-Chama water from the Rio Grande for direct 
consumption. Other New Mexico cities, including Las Cruces, one o f the fastest-growing 
cities in the country, also are counting on water from the San Juan-Chama project to 
relieve them from their reliance on overtaxed aquifers. Still, agricultural diversions 
account for about 80% of the water use in the middle Rio Grande. The future of 
diversions in this stretch has been in doubt since 1994, when the Rio Grande silvery 
minnow, the only one of five fish native to the middle Rio Grande to survive, was listed 
as endangered. Once widespread throughout the basin, it is now limited to the middle 
stretch of the river, portions of which are subject to regular dewatering. During the 
drought of 1996, more than 1000 silvery minnows reportedly died when irrigators 
diverted virtually the entire flow of the river.
Moving west and north, we reach the Colorado River system itself, a source of water for 
more than 25 million people. Denver, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, Tucson, Los Angeles, Las 
Vegas, Los Angeles and, through the San Juan-Chama project, Santa Fe and 
Albuquerque, all rely to some degree on Colorado River Water. The Colorado also 
irrigates agriculture in the seven states it serves, and generates some 12 billion kilowatt 
hours of electricity annually. Dozens of dams, including giant Hoover and Glen Canyon, 
dot the Colorado and its tributaries, making it one of the most controlled river systems in 
the world. Water is diverted hundreds of miles from the river to reach the region’s farms 
and population centers. These dams and diversions have radically altered nearly every 
feature of the aquatic environment, including water temperature, sediment loads, and 
accessibility to fish migration. Four native fish, the Colorado pikeminnow (formerly 
known as the Colorado squawfish), razorback sucker, bonytail chub, and humpback chub, 
have been listed as endangered. In addition, the endangered southwestern willow 
flycatcher inhabits the lower Colorado basin, and its fate is tied to management of the 
river’s waters.
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Although some Colorado River water goes to slake the thirst of Los Angeles, most of the 
Colorado water that reaches California is allocated to agricultural use. Moving still 
further west, we reach a more important source of water for California’s cities, the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta which empties into San Francisco Bay. The Delta is “the 
hub of California’s water distribution system.” Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta 
Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341 (1996). Nearly half the 
runoff in the state flows through the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers to the Delta. 
From there, massive pumps divert water to the federal Central Valley Project and the 
State Water Project. The Delta supplies 40% of the state’s drinking water, as well as 
irrigation for the state’s agricultural industry. Diversion of freshwater from the Delta, 
together with invasion by alien species and other factors, have produced a crisis in the 
Delta fisheries over the past generation. The Delta smelt, Sacramento splittail, Central 
Valley steelhead and Central Valley spring-run chinook are listed as threatened. The 
winter-run chinook are endangered and the fall and late fall runs are considered 
candidates for listing. Last June, pumping from the Delta had to be slowed, creating a 
minor water crisis, because Delta smelt had lingered around the pumps later in the season 
than expected. Environmental groups claimed more than 100,000 smelt were killed in the 
pumps.
Moving up the coast for our final stop, we reach the Pacific northwest The plight of the 
salmon in this region is well known. By 1999, twenty-three salmon runs had been listed 
under the ESA, ranging from southern California to the border with Canada. Michael C. 
Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the 
Columbia Basin, 74 Wash. L, Rev. 511,519 (1999). The Columbia River basin is home 
to the largest concentration of these listed runs, including various runs of sockeye, 
chinook, and coho salmon, steelhead, chum, and bull trout. Hydropower dams, fishing, 
and forest practices have all been implicated as major factors in the decline of the 
northwest salmon. Urban populations are implicated in the decline of salmon through 
their consumption of electricity; the Columbia River dams produce about one-third of the
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electricity used in the region. In addition, the listing last year of chinook salmon and bull 
trout in the Puget Sound brought the Endangered Species Act directly to a major 
metropolitan area, Seattle.
III. The ESA and Municipal Water Use
The Endangered Species Act is jointly administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) for the Department of Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
for the Department of Commerce (together ‘The Services”). FWS has lead responsibility 
for the vast majority of listed species, but NMFS is responsible for marine species, 
including anadromous fish.
The Services maintain a list of species determined to be threatened or endangered. 16 
U.S.C. § 1533. The statute defines the term “species” to include subspecies and distinct 
population segments of vertebrate animals. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). A species is 
“endangered” if it is in danger of extinction throughout all or a substantial portion of its 
range. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). It is “threatened” if it is likely to become endangered in the 
foreseeable future. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
The ESA directs the Services to designate critical habitat for each species, to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable, coincident with listing. 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(a)(3). Critical habitat includes areas essential to the conservation of the species 
which may require special management considerations or protection. 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(5)(A). Despite this provision, critical habitat has not yet been designated for the 
majority of listed species. The Services resist designating critical habitat, in part because 
the statute requires a time-consuming analysis of economic impacts as a prerequisite to 
designation. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
4
Listed species receive the protection of the ESA’s two primary regulatory provisions,
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sections 7 and 9. Section 7 requires federal agencies to carry out programs for the 
conservation of listed species, and to insure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any listed species or adversely modify its designated critical 
habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. Section 9 forbids the “take,” broadly defined, of endangered 
and, in many cases, threatened animals. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
A. Section 7 applies to municipal water supplies with a federal nexus. It imposes
two duties, an affirmative one to conserve listed species, and a negative one not to 
jeopardize their continued existence.
1. Section 7(a)(1) requires all federal agencies to use their authorities “in
furtherance of the purposes of [the ESA] by carrying out programs for the 
conservation” of fisted species. Conservation means “the use of all 
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered 
species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided 
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
To satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(1), each federal agency must 
develop and carry out, in consultation with the Services, programs for the 
conservation of each and every listed species that its actions may affect. 
Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998). This duty is 
enforceable through the ESA’s citizen suit provision and the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. Although it does not allow the agency 
to forego conservation in favor of other goals, section 7(a)(1) has been 
interpreted to leave federal agencies with considerable discretion to 
determine what specific measures their conservation programs will 
include. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dept, of the Navy, 898 F.2d 
1410 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Section 7(a)(1) does not expand agencies’ authority beyond existing 
statutory limits. Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat 
Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992). It does, 
however, permit agencies to use their existing authorities to provide as 
much protection as possible for listed species. So, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that the Interior Department could reserve all of the 
Washoe Project’s water for the conservation of two listed fish, even if not 
all the water is needed to avoid jeopardy. Carson-Truckee Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984). Where a federal 
agency is so inclined, therefore, it can use section 7(a)(1) to justify 
reserving for listed species any water it is not obligated by statute to 
deliver.
2. Section 7(a)(2) requires that federal agencies, in consultation with the
Services, insure that actions they authorize, fund, or carry out are not likely 
to jeopardize the continued existence of fisted species or destroy or 
adversely modify designated critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
Federal actions are subject to section 7 so long as “discretionary Federal 
involvement or control” remains. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03. The Supreme 
Court held in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), that closing the gates on 
the nearly complete Tellico Dam was a federal action subject to the 
strictures of section 7. Following that lead, the lower federal courts have 
tended to construe “agency action” broadly. Only if the federal agency has 
no discretion to control the action in a way that might change its impacts 
on a listed species is section 7 inapplicable. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 
F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Renewal of contracts for delivery of water from federal projects is subject
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to section 7. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 
1118 (9th Cir. 1998). Even absent contract renewal, where a federal 
agency operates or has authority to manage a dam or other water project, it 
must do so in accordance with the ESA, even if that means withholding 
contractually promised water. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. 
Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2000); O’Neill v. U.S., 50 F.3d 677 
(9th Cir. 1995). No court has yet directly considered whether section 
7(a)(1) allows agencies to override their contractual obligations in 
situations where meeting those obligations would not cause jeopardy, but 
Klamath Water Users suggests that it might. Although consultation would 
appear to be required on operation o f FERC-licensed dams, procedural 
quirks have blocked recent lawsuits seeking to compel such consultation. 
See Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 F. Supp.
1166 (D. Ariz. 1997); American Rivers v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 
1998).
In the Albuquerque dispute, one issue is the extent of federal control over 
water diverted to the Rio Grande through the San Juan - Chama project. 
The City has filed suit to immunize its project water from any requirement 
that water be left in the Rio Grande to protect the silvery minnow, 
claiming that the United States has no authority to withhold that water for 
ESA purposes. City of Albuquerque v. United States, CV-99-0985 
RLP/DJS-ACE (D.N.M., filed Sept. 1, 1999). The Bureau of Reclamation 
seems to share the City’s view. On the other hand, a coalition of 
environmental groups has challenged the Bureau of Reclamation’s 
programmatic biological assessment for the middle Rio Grande on the 
grounds that it fails to recognize the extent of the agency’s authority and
4
obligations under the ESA. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez, CV- 
99-1020 JP (D. N.M., filed Nov. 15, 1999).
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3. Section 7(a)(2) can also affect municipal wastewater discharges.
Like other point sources, wastewater treatment plants which discharge 
effluent to the waters of the United States must have National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under the Clean Water 
Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Issuance of an NPDES permit by EPA 
itself is a federal action subject to section 7 consultation, although EPA 
has not always voluntarily engaged in such consultation. In New Mexico, 
for example, EPA recently settled a lawsuit with an agreement to consult 
with respect to NPDES permits that may affect endangered species, 
including the permit for Albuquerque’s wastewater treatment plant.
Most states have been delegated authority to issue NPDES permits. See 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). It is less clear how section 7 applies in the context of 
delegated permit programs. EPA and FWS now agree that approval by 
EPA of state water quality standards and delegation of NPDES authority to 
the states also require consultation. See Draft Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
and National Marine Fisheries Service Regarding Enhanced Coordination 
Under the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 
2742 (Jan. 15, 1999). The Draft Memorandum of Agreement provides that 
EPA will amend its Clean Water Act regulations to explicitly require that 
state water quality standards not jeopardize federally listed species. Id. at 
2744. EPA itself will consult with FWS regarding the water quality 
criteria it issues to guide state water quality standard determinations, and 
will not require separate consultation on state standards identical, or more 
stringent than, the relevant criteria. Id  at 2745.
Some uncertainty remains as to how or whether section 7(a)(2) applies to
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Clean Water Act NPDES permits issued by state agencies under delegated 
authority. The Fifth Circuit has held that EPA lacks the authority to 
compel state permitting agencies to consult with FWS before issuing 
NPDES permits. American Forest and Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291 
(5th Cir. 1998). EPA disagrees with that decision, but believes it permits 
the approach taken in the draft Memorandum of Agreement. Under 
existing Clean Water Act regulations, the state agency must provide copies 
of draft permits to FWS as well as to EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 124.10(c)(l)(iv). 
EPA will use its full authority under the Clean Water Act to veto any 
permit that it determines, in coordination with FWS, is likely to jeopardize 
or adversely modify the critical habitat of a listed species. 64 Fed. Reg. at 
2755-56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d); 64 Fed. Reg. at 2746.
4. When there is a federal action, the action agency must formally consult 
with FWS if the action may affect a listed species or its critical habitat. 
Consultation culminates in issuance of a biological opinion by FWS as to 
whether the action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a 
species or adversely modify critical habitat.
An action causes jeopardy if, on the basis of the best available scientific 
information, it “reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to 
reduce appreciably the. likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a 
listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or 
distribution of that species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. Destruction or adverse 
modification of critical habitat has been defined as “a direct or indirect 
alteration that appreciably diminishes the value” of the habitat for survival 
and recovery. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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FWS believes that the “adverse modification” prong of section 7(a)(2)
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adds little to the “jeopardy” prong. “For almost all species, the adverse 
modification and jeopardy standards are the same . . Notice of Intent to 
Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 31871 (June 14,1999). Clearly not everyone agrees that critical 
habitat designation is redundant. Critical habitat determination remains a 
flashpoint for controversy. The Service did not designate critical habitat 
for the Rio Grande silvery minnow, for example, until it was compelled to 
do so by litigation. When it did designate critical habitat, its decision was 
quickly challenged, by the state and irrigators on one side, and 
environmental groups on the other.
In determining whether jeopardy or adverse modification of critical habitat 
is likely to result from an agency action, FWS must consider the direct and 
indirect effects of the proposed action, together with the effects of other 
interrelated and interdependent actions. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (defining 
“effects of the action” that must be considered). Indirect effects “are those 
that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still are 
reasonably certain to occur.” Jd. In evaluating an application to construct 
a dam in federal waters, for example, the Corps of Engineers must 
consider not only the on-site effects of the dam on water quality, but also 
downstream reductions in flow caused by increases consumption 
facilitated by the project. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 
508 (10th Cir. 1985). The effects of any population growth induced by the 
action on listed species must also be considered. Florida Key Deer v. 
Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1994); National Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Coleman, 529 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1976).
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When it issues a “jeopardy” opinion, concluding that the action is likely to 
cause jeopardy or adverse modification of critical habitat, FWS must offer
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reasonable and prudent alternatives, if any, that it believes would avoid 
jeopardy or adverse modification. 16 U.S.C. § 1536; 50 C.F.R. 402.02.
The production of biological opinions by the Services is a difficult and 
controversial process, necessarily resting on somewhat uncertain science 
and forecasts of future events. A recent analysis by Professor Michael 
Blumm and a co-author details both the broad scope and limitations of 
biological opinions in the context of Pacific salmon. See Blumm and 
Corbin, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 519 (1999).
B. Section 9, applicable to all actions, regardless of whether they have a federal 
nexus, imposes a series of prohibitions. Of most relevance to municipal water 
issues is the prohibition on “take” of endangered animals, but restrictions on 
injury to plants may also be of concern.
1. Section 9 prohibits the “take,” broadly defined, of endangered animals.
“Take” means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or attempt to do any of those. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
“Harass” is defined by regulation as an intentional or negligent act or 
omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it 
to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns 
including, but not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 50 C.F.R. § 
17.3. “Harm” includes significant habitat modification or degradation that 
actually kills or injures listed wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering. Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the regulatory definition of “harm” against a
4facial challenge in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). In a concurring opinion, Justice
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O’Connor emphasized her understanding that ‘"the regulation’s application 
is limited by ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce 
notions of foreseeability.” Id, at 709. In two footnotes Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, agreed. See id. at 697 n.9, 700 n.13. Sweet 
Home’s discussion of proximate cause and foreseeability have not had 
much impact on subsequent cases. The 11th Cir. has suggested that this 
aspect of Sweet Home is merely dicta. Loggerhead Turtle v. County 
Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1251 n.23 (11th Cir. 1998).
No reported opinion has so far rejected a claim under section 9 for lack of 
proximate cause or foreseeability.
The Sweet Home opinion’s emphasis on the fact that habitat modification 
does not constitute take unless it actually kills or injures a member of the 
listed species seems to have had more impact. Although expert testimony 
concerning the impacts of an action on the species can still be sufficient to 
prove harm without the production of a particular body or injured animal, 
courts may be looking a bit more skeptically at expert opinions. See, e.g., 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that plaintiffs had not proven that proposed construction of school would 
harm or harass pygmy owls); Arizona Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Serv., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding that 
FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing incidental take statement 
including measures to restrict grazing near streams because there was no 
evidence that listed species were even present on allotments in question, 
much less that they would be killed or injured by grazing). Although some 
commentators suggested immediately after Sweet Home that the opinion 
prohibited injunctions prior to actual harm, the Ninth Circuit has since
4held that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a listed species is 
sufficient to support the issuance of an injunction. Marbled Murrelet v.
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Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996).
Knowing violations of the prohibition on take are punishable by civil 
penalties of up to $25,000 per violation and criminal penalties of up to 
$50,000 per violation and imprisonment for up to one year. 16 U.S.C. § 
1540(a), (b). In addition, citizen suits are available to enjoin any violation. 
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). Prevailing plaintiffs can recover their attorney fees. 
Id.
2. Plants receive less protection than animals under section 9. The take 
prohibition does not extend to plants. Section 9 does make it unlawful to: 
remove or maliciously damage or destroy endangered plants from areas 
under federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy them on federal 
lands; or remove, cut, dig up, damage or destroy them on other lands in 
knowing violation of state law or in the course of any violation of state 
trespass law. Water withdrawals and pollution, even if they harm plants, 
are unlikely to violate any of these strictures, unless state law requires that 
water required by a listed plant be left in the ground or in a stream.
3. Municipal water uses may cause the take of listed species in a number of 
different ways.
\
The most obvious is by withdrawals of ground or surface water that reduce 
streamflows below levels required by listed species. In 1993, a district 
court held that lowering of spring flows from San Marcos and Comal 
Springs by excessive pumping from the Edwards Aquifer constituted take 
of the fountain darter. Nonetheless, when spring flows again decreased in
41996, FWS declared that it would not take enforcement action against 
pumpers. The Sierra Club filed a citizen suit, and obtained an order
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putting in place an emergency water withdrawal reduction plan, although 
that order was subsequently vacated by the Fifth Circuit on the grounds 
that the district court should have abstained in favor of a state 
administrative process. The complex Edwards litigation is summarized in 
Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish that Roared: The Endangered Species 
Act, State Groundwater Law, and Private Property Rights Collide Over the 
Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 Envtl. L. 845 (1998).
FWS has identified groundwater pumping and surface water diversions as 
potential threats to many other listed species in the west, including species 
that are not strictly aquatic. See, e.g.. Designation of Critical Habitat for 
the Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-owl, 64 Fed. Reg. 37419,37425 (July 12, 
1999) (identifying groundwater pumping as an activity that could 
adversely modify critical habitat or jeopardize the continued existence of 
the species); Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Southwestern 
Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. Reg. 39129 (July 22, 1997).
Even if minimum streamflows remain, the act of diverting water may itself 
cause a take. See U.S. v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, 788 F. Supp.
1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that irrigators whose pumping operations 
battered listed fish against fish screens had committed a take of the fish). 
Dams or other structures that prevent access to spawning grounds can also 
take listed fish.
Perhaps of greatest concern to local governments are several cases holding 
that state and local governments may be liable under the ESA if they 
permit others to engage in actions that take listed species, fiee Strahan v. 
Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council 
of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231 (11 Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Town of
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Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998). A recent district court 
decision places some limits on this sort of “regulatory take” liability. In 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia, No. 6:95-CV-587-ORL- 
22B (M.D. Fla. 2000), 2000 WL 433482, the county was held not to have 
taken listed turtles through its beach lighting ordinance. The ordinance 
followed a state model ordinance, the county had sought the advise of 
federal officials in drafting it, there was no contention that the county had 
failed to enforce its ordinance, and the recovery plans for the turtles 
suggested that federal lighting standards would be adopted where local 
regulations proved inadequate. As the court viewed the allegations, 
“Plaintiffs wish to hold the County liable for takings because its beach 
residents are not turning off their lights in compliance with the ordinance.” 
Nonetheless, a regulatory body that specifically authorizes actions that 
take listed species risks liability.
Professor J.B. Ruhl reports that FWS, presumably relying on these 
decisions, persuaded a water development agency in the Austin, Texas 
area “to condition user access to a new water supply line on construction 
standards designed. . .  to avoid harm to an aquatic salamander species” on 
the theory that the water line would spur local growth, which could impair 
water quality through runoff, harming the species. J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem 
Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of Relevance, Natural 
Resources & Environment, Winter 2000, at 156,161. Even more striking, 
the Edwards Aquifer litigation resulted in this creation of a new state 
administrative agency, the Edwards Aquifer Authority, and withdrawal of 
the aquifer from the capture rule historically applied by Texas to 
groundwater. See Voteller, 28 Envtl. L. 845.
4
4. There are three major avenues for exemption from section 9 liability, each
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of which has been invoked in connection with water conflicts.
The first applies only to species listed as threatened rather than 
endangered. Section 4(d) of the ESA directs the Services to adopt such 
regulations as necessary and advisable for the conservation of threatened 
species, up to the full application of section 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). 
Section 4(d) rules can permit actions that would otherwise violate section 
9, provided those actions are not inconsistent with conservation of the 
species, that is with their progress toward recovery. NMFS has recently 
proposed section 4(d) rules that would exempt diverters who install and 
properly maintain approved fish screens from potential liability under 
section 9 for harm to a number of threatened west coast salmonids. 
Proposed Rule Governing Take of Threatened Snake River, Central 
California Coast, South/Central California Coast, Lower Columbia River, 
Central Valley California, Middle Columbia River, and Upper Willamette 
River Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs of West Coast Steelhead),
64 Fed. Reg. 73479, 73490 (Dec. 30,1999); Proposed Rule Governing 
Take of Seven Threatened Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs) of 
West Coast Salmonids, 65 Fed. Reg. 170,180-81 (Jan. 3,2000).
The second exemption from section 9 liability applies when consultation 
under section 7 has resulted in a “no-jeopardy” biological opinion. The 
Services include with each “no jeopardy” opinion an incidental take 
statement specifying the extent of taking expected from the action and 
with reasonable and prudent measures, consistent with the basic design of 
the action, to reduce the impact of that taking. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 
C.F.R. 402.14(h). Acts in compliance with the terms and conditions o f an
4incidental take statement do not violate section 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2). 
Although the incidental take statement is issued to the consulting federal
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agency, it protects anyone whose actions are within its scope against 
liability under section 9. See Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 
1996). But only take within the scope contemplated by the incidental take 
statement is protected. Take that exceeds expected levels, such as the 
massive entrainment of Delta smelt in the pumps last June, is supposed to 
trigger reinitiation of consultation, and may well violate section 9.
Finally, where there is no federal nexus, actions that would otherwise 
violate section 9 can be authorized by an incidental take permit issued 
under section 10. Permits may be issued for takings incidental to 
otherwise lawful activity. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). The applicant for an 
incidental take permit must submit a habitat conservation plan (HCP) 
specifying the impact of the taking; the steps the applicant will take to 
minimize those impacts, and the funding available for those steps; 
alternative actions that were considered, and the reasons for rejecting 
them; and such other measures as the agency may require. 16 U.S.C. § 
1539(a)(2)(A). The permit shall be issued if the Service finds that: the 
taking is incidental to some other lawful activity; the impacts of the taking 
will be minimized and mitigated to the maximum extent practicable; 
adequate funding will be provided; and the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery in the wild (i.e. the taking 
will not be likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the species). 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). HCPs can include species that are not yet listed, 
providing authorization to take them should they later be added to the 
protected list.
Incidental take permits may run for as long as FWS determines is
4appropriate under the circumstances. Terms as long as 50 or 100 years are 
not unusual. During that term, the “No Surprises” policy protects the
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permit holder from increased mitigation obligations or restrictions due to 
unforeseen circumstances. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5). I f  
an approved HCP proves insufficient to protect the species, the 
government, rather than the permittee, bears the costs of providing the 
additional protection necessary.
Although the bulk of the incidental take permits issued to date have’dealt 
with terrestrial species, water agencies and others have recently begun to 
seek them for aquatic species. The Edwards Aquifer Authority, for 
example, is in the process of developing one. Large-scale HCPs are also 
in process for the Bay-Delta and lower Colorado River. Many smaller 
scale HCPs are also in various stages of preparation and review.
IV. Early Lessons from an Ongoing Experiment
We are still at the beginning of the era of conflicts between endangered species and the 
growing urban population of the west. Nonetheless, we can draw several tentative 
conclusions based on the experience to date:
A. The sharpest conflicts are likely to be over water quantity, and the changes in 
quality that come with reductions in the amount of water, rather than pollution. 
Loss of water is a more important threat to aquatic species than urban (as opposed 
to agricultural) runoff. Conveniently, losses of water are also more easily 
addressed by the ESA. The effects of runoff are difficult to trace to any particular 
source. But it should be relatively easy to prove harm as a result of large 
municipal diversions, and those diversions often have a federal nexus sufficient to 
invoke section 7.
4
B. Far more than in the case of terrestrial species, section 7 and section 10 are
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intertwined with respect to aquatic species. Water projects, large and small, often 
combine federal and non-federal elements. In the Delta, for example, the parallel 
state and federal water projects both operate pumps that may kill listed species. 
Tacoma’s proposal to update its municipal water system includes both 
modifications to its existing diversion facilities and addition of storage capacity to 
a Corps of Engineers reservoir.
In this context, the section 7 consultation process needs to work in concert with 
the section 10 incidental permit process. Combining the two may be awkward, 
because their standards are somewhat different. The biggest difference is in the 
degree of certainty they provide. Section 10 permits typically include “no 
surprises” clauses that assure the permittee that the action can continue without 
additional mitigation even if the species declines. Section 7 provides no such' 
certainty. So long as federal action remains, changed circumstances can require 
reinitiation of consultation, and may produce a jeopardy conclusion.
In partial compensation for this complication, large water projects seem 
particularly suited for regional, ecosystem-wide processes to resolve ESA issues. 
See Mary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered 
Species Act as Applied to Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 197 
(1998). Complicated as these systems are, an administrative system is already in 
place, the relevant parties are known, and the distribution of water is typically 
controlled by one or a small number of entities. Ecosystem-scale processes 
currently underway in California’s Bay-Delta, the upper and lower Colorado River 
basins, and the Columbia River system may provide a practical opportunity to 
work out the interface between section 7 and section 10.
C. The conflicts are not simply between urban uses of water and the needs of aquatic 
species. In reality, they are between aquatic species and all human uses. Species
21
declines and additional listings will exacerbate existing tensions between urban 
and agricultural water uses. The ESA is agnostic about whether agriculture or 
urban uses bear the burden of supporting wildlife. State and local governments 
will be able to choose whether to limit urban growth to leave water for 
agricultural use, or to facilitate water transfers from agriculture to support urban 
growth.
Even within the urban use category, state and local governments face choices 
about how to distribute water. A fixed amount of water can support more people 
if landscape irrigation is restricted, by regulatory means or incentives. The ESA is 
already encouraging adoption of municipal conservation measures.
D. Land use and water use are inextricably, albeit somewhat loosely, linked. Still, in 
most western states there is little integration of water planning into the local land 
use decisions that control the speed and direction of population growth. Dan 
Tarlock and Sarah Van de Wetering have recently described in detail the ways that 
law and tradition in the west discourage the integration of land and water 
planning, as well as how that historic separation may be eroding. See A. Dan 
Tarlock and Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water 
Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 Hastings West-Northwest J. Envtl. L. 
& Pol’y 163 (1999).
The ESA could, at least in theory, provide a nudge in the direction of coordinated 
land and water planning. Local governments that approve growth that will 
consume water might risk liability for any take that results. The connection is 
somewhat indirect, complicated by the possibilities of water conservation 
measures, acquisition of water from other sources, such as agricultural transfers,
4and perhaps by reluctance of courts to require land use agencies to push the limits 
of their authority. Certainly federal regulators are unlikely to pursue such claims.
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Probably the impetus for change will have to come from the states and local 
governments themselves. The possibility, even if remote, of section 9 liability 
may encourage risk averse local officials to pressure states for the authority or 
even requirement to factor water supplies into planning. Furthermore, states may 
see changes in their regulatory regimes as preferable to surrendering control of 
water resources to state regulators or the courts, as Texas did when it enacted the 
Edwards Aquifer Act. The ESA, even if it does not directly reorient state water 
and land use law, may provide a political push toward that change.
4
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